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Abstract | Recent developments in a variety of sectors, including health care, research and the
direct-to-consumer industry, have led to a dramatic increase in the amount of genomic data
that are collected, used and shared. This state of affairs raises new and challenging concerns
for personal privacy, both legally and technically. This Review appraises existing and emerging
threats to genomic data privacy and discusses how well current legal frameworks and technical
safeguards mitigate these concerns. It concludes with a discussion of remaining and emerging
challenges and illustrates possible solutions that can balance protecting privacy and realizing
the benefits that result from the sharing of genetic information.
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There are many stories in the media highlighting the
multitude of ways by which genomic data are now
relied upon, including in basic research, clinical care,
discovering relatives and ancestral origins, tracking
down criminals, and identification of victims. At the
same time, numerous reports from around the world
illustrate that some people are concerned about how
genomic information that relates to them are used, often
stated as challenges to privacy. These apprehensions do
have some foundation as people can suffer harm if data
about them are used in ways they do not agree with, for
example, to examine ancestry1 or to create commercial
products2 without the individual’s approval, or if the data
are used in a manner that causes an individual to suffer
adverse consequences such as stigmatization3, disruption of familial relationships4,5 or loss of employment
or insurance. However, the law provides limited, patchy
protection6,7.
The concept of privacy and its protection has many
facets8. People may wish to control how genomic data
about them are used but, in many cases, they only have
the choice to opt in (or opt out) based on the terms contained in a consent form or a service agreement9, which
frequently goes unread10,11. In other instances, people
may not have any choice at all about how genomic data
about them are used, such as when data are deemed
to be anonymised in accordance with the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)12 of the European
Union (EU), de-identified in accordance with the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA)13–15 or considered non-human subject data in
accordance with the Common Rule for the Protection
of Human Research Participants16 in the United States.
Another aspect of privacy is the right to solitude
(often voiced as the right to be left alone), a principle

Nature Reviews | Genetics
0123456789();:

first formalized in legal circles in the late 1800s17, which
could include the right not to be (re)contacted about
ancillary findings generated from genomic testing or
discovery-driven investigations into existing genomic
data sets18,19 or by previously unknown relatives20,21.
Yet, the right to privacy has never been absolute,
in part because many uses of these data, such as clinical care, research, exploring ancestry, finding relatives
and identifying criminal suspects and victims of mass
casualties, can be valued by users, other stakeholders,
or society at large. For example, even though physicians
have strong ethical and legal duties of confidentiality that
require them not to disclose patients’ information to others, these obligations are not unconditional because the
law has created numerous exceptions such as for public
health reporting22 or in criminal investigations.
Although the tension between privacy and data utility raises an array of ethical issues23–25 regarding when
genomic data can be accessed and used, this Review
focuses on the primary tools that are applied to define
and protect these boundaries: law (as instantiated in
statutes, regulatory regimes and case law), policy and
technology. Several reviews on genomic data privacy
have been published over the years in response to the
evolution of approaches to intrude upon, and protect,
privacy. Initially, Malin appraised the robustness of
genetic data de-identification26. This study was followed
by Erlich and Narayanan who analysed and categorized
computational methods for re-identification, in light of
new techniques for surname inference, and potential
risk mitigation techniques27. Naveed et al. reviewed the
privacy and security threats that arise over the course of
the genomic data lifecycle, from data generation to its
end uses28. Wang et al. studied the technical and ethical
aspects of genetic privacy29. Arellano et al. reviewed
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Blockchains
A blockchain is a decentralized
digital ledger of records, called
blocks, that are linked together
using cryptography and
are distributed across a
peer-to-peer network of
computers.

policies and technologies for protecting the privacy
of biomedical data in general30. More recently, Mittos
et al. systematically reviewed privacy-enhancing technologies for genomic data and particularly highlighted
the challenges associated with using cryptography to
maintain privacy over a long period of time31. Grishin
et al. reviewed the emerging cryptographic tools for protecting genomic privacy with a focus on blockchains32.
Bonomi et al. reviewed privacy challenges as well as
technical research opportunities for genomic data
applications such as direct-to-consumer genetic testing (DTC-GT) and forensic investigations33. Similarly,
numerous articles have addressed the incomplete and
inconsistent protection that the law provides from harms
to individuals and groups in different settings3,19,34–36.
Our Review diverges from prior work in that we consider it essential to discuss the legal and technological
perspectives together. This is because technological interventions can heighten, but also ameliorate, legal risks,
whereas some laws provide control or protect people
from downstream harm from data use, thereby opening
the door to different and perhaps less stringent technological protections. Moreover, recent disruptions associated with mandates for data sharing37,38, the DTC-GT
revolution and the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic — events that have dramatically accelerated
the collection and use of genomic data39–41 — have dramatically changed the social environment in which
genomic data are obtained and used. Blending legal and
technical protections in a holistic ecosystem of genomic
data is challenging because protections are interconnected but vary in the environments in which they were
developed, the stakeholders involved and their underlying assumptions. To demystify the connections among
and the assumptions behind different legal and technical
protections, we partition the ecosystem into four settings:
health care, research, DTC and forensic settings.
In this Review, we begin with a brief overview of
attacks on privacy in the context of genomic data sharing and subsequently discuss both how to mitigate privacy risks (through technical and legal safeguards) as
well as the consequences of failing to do so effectively.
Next, we categorize legal protections according to different settings since each setting tends to have unique
laws and policies; meanwhile, we identify settings where
each technical protection was first introduced and/or
has been frequently applied. We consider the particular
challenges that can arise in the research setting itself.
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We then note that genomics researchers also need an
appreciation of the larger ecology of the flows of genomic
data outside the research and health-care settings in
light of their impact on data privacy and public opinion and thus ultimately on public support for genomic
research. Thus, we discuss DTC-GT, the obligations that
companies that provide these tests owe to users, and the
consequences of use by consumers to find relatives and
by law enforcement to find criminal suspects. For reference, Fig. 1 illustrates an overview of privacy intrusions and safeguards in the ecology of genomic data
flows, and Table 1 summarizes various aspects of the
technical literature featured in this Review. In our discussions, a first party refers to the individual to whom
the data correspond, whereas a second party refers to the
organization (or individual) who collects and/or uses
the data for a purpose that the first party is made aware of.
By contrast, third parties refer to users (or recipients)
of data who have the ability to communicate with the
second party only and might include malicious attackers.
Examples of third parties include researchers who access
data from an existing research study or a pharmaceutical
company that partners with a DTC-GT company. We
conclude with a discussion of what legal revisions and
technical advances may be warranted to balance privacy
protection with the benefits to individuals, commercial
entities, researchers and society that result from flows
of genomic data.

Privacy intrusions and protections
Privacy intrusions
Individuals may suffer harm when data about them are
used without their permission in ways they do not agree
with. In contrast to summary data aggregated across
many participants, individual-level data that identify
the people to whom they pertain, not surprisingly,
pose a greater risk of harm to the person. For example,
breaches of identified data might reveal a health condition that the participant had wished not to become
public or cause them to suffer adverse consequences
such as reputational damage or loss of employment,
insurance, or other economic goods3. These disclosures
can occur when data holders lose the data, for instance,
by misplacing an unencrypted laptop, or when third parties deliberately attack large, identified data collections;
therefore, security becomes particularly important when
conducting research using identified data.
Much research using genomic data, however, is
conducted with additional types of data, such as demographics, social and behavioural determinants of health,
and phenotypic information at the molecular and/or
clinical level (for example, data derived from electronic health records), from which standard identifying
information have been removed. Yet, there has been a
vigorous debate about whether genomic data can be
de-identified or anonymised on its own or in combination with the accompanying individual information.
Over the years, a number of investigators have famously
demonstrated their ability to re-identify individuals
whose data have been used without common identifiers for genomics research. The following provides a
summary of these attacks.
www.nature.com/nrg
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Fig. 1 | An overview of privacy intrusions and safeguards in genomic data
flows. The four routes of genomic data flow (as indicated by the arrow colours)
represent four settings in which data are used or shared: health care (red),
research (gold), direct-to-consumer (DTC; green) and forensic (dark blue).
The grey line represents a combination of the first three settings. In the
health-care setting, data collected by a health-care entity (for example,
Vanderbilt University Medical Center) are protected by the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA)128 and the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)116,117 for primary uses. In the
research setting, data collected by a research entity (for example, 1000
Genomes Project, Electronic Medical Records and Genomics (eMERGE)
network or All of Us Research Program) are primarily protected by the
Common Rule14,124 for primary uses and protected by the US National Institutes
of Health (NIH) data sharing policy37,38 for secondary uses. In the DTC setting,
data collected by a DTC entity are protected by the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)12 and/or the US state privacy laws (for
example, California Consumer Privacy Act130, California Privacy Rights Act131
or Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act132) for primary uses and protected

Short tandem repeats
(STRs). Short tandemly
repeated DNA sequences
that occur when two or more
nucleotides (A, T, C or G) are
repeated and the repeated
sequences are adjacent to
each other.

0123456789();:

Third parties

by self-regulation (for example, data use agreements36, privacy policies173 or
terms of service174) for secondary uses. In the forensic setting, data shared with
law enforcement are protected by informed consent192. A first party refers
to the individual to whom the data correspond, whereas a second party
refers to the organization (or individual) who collects and/or uses the data for
a purpose that the first party is made aware of. By contrast, third parties refer
to users (or recipients) of data who have the ability to communicate with the
second party only and might include malicious attackers. Examples of third
parties include researchers who access data from an existing research study or
a pharmaceutical company that partners with a DTC genetic testing company.
The data flow from a DTC entity to a research entity is represented by the arrow
at the bottom. Confidentiality is mostly concerned when data are being used,
whereas anonymity and solitude are mostly concerned when data are being
shared. Specifically, cryptographic tools31 protect confidentiality against
unauthorized access attacks, whereas access control27 and data perturbation
approaches83 protect anonymity against privacy intrusions such as
re-identification and membership inference attacks. We simplify the figure by
omitting the impacts of GDPR and data use agreements in the research setting.

Re-identification. Sharing individual-level genomic data,
even without explicit identifiers, creates an opportunity
for re-identification42. For example, a data recipient
could infer phenotypic information from genomic data
that may be leveraged for re-identification purposes27,43.
In one study, researchers re-identified individuals in a
data set of whole-genome sequences by predicting visual
traits, including eye and skin colour44. Similarly, genomic
attributes might be inferred from phenotypic traits
(for example, physically observable disorders45, visual
traits46,47 or 3D facial structures48) for re-identification
purposes, although the actual power of these attacks is
debatable47,49,50. In addition, known pedigree structures
may be leveraged to re-identify genomic records51.
Moreover, potential identifiers may be inferred from
the demographic information that is often shared with
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genomic data, through linkage to other readily accessible data sources. In 2013, participants of the Personal
Genome Project52 were re-identified by Sweeney et al.
by linking these participants’ data records to publicly
available voter registration lists using demographic
attributes53. In the same year, Gymrek et al. re-identified
certain participants of the 1000 Genomes Project by
first inferring surnames from short tandem repeats
(STRs) on the Y chromosome, which, in combination
with other demographics, were then linked to identified
public resources54.
Membership inference. In genome–phenome investigations, such as genome-wide association studies (GWAS),
researchers commonly publish only summary statistics
that are useful for meta-analyses55. However, in 2008,
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Table 1 | A taxonomy of technical research articles on genomic data privacy featured in this Review
Attack or
protection

Use

Data flow

Data level

setting

How attacks or
protections are
achieved

Attributes studied other than
genotypes/how data are used

Refs

Secondary

Share

Individual

Health care

Re-ID

Demographics, hospital trail

42

Research

Re-ID

NA

84

Pedigree

51

Re-ID, genotype
imputation

Signal profiles

90

Re-ID, genotype
inference

Diseases

Anonymity
Attack

Re-ID, non-genotypic
attribute inference

45

Visual traits/3D facial structures
Demographics, name

53

Demographics, surname

54

Face, traits, demographics
Research, DTC

Summary

Research

Secondary

Share

Individual

Summary

Research

Research

44,49,50

Genotype imputation

NA

Genotype imputation

Pedigree

64

Genotype
imputation, genotype
inference, genotype
reconstruction

Pedigree

66

85,86

Membership inference GWAS statistics
Membership
inference, genotype
inference

Protection

46–48

56–58,60,96,97

Machine learning model,
demographics

61

GWAS statistics, pedigree

106

Membership
inference,
non-genotypic
attribute inference

Disease status

62

Membership
inference, re-ID,
genotype imputation

GWAS statistics

59

Membership
inference,
re-ID, genotype
inference, genotype
reconstruction

GWAS statistics, visual traits

98

Generalization

RNA sequences

89

Generalization,
suppression,
k-anonymity

NA

88

Masking/hiding, risk
assessment

Demographics

93

Suppression, risk
assessment

NA

92

Beacons

Disease
GWAS statistics, pedigree

95
101

Beacons, differential
privacy

GWAS statistics

99,100

Beacons, risk
assessment

GWAS statistics

102

Differential privacy

GWAS statistics

103–105,107,108

Generative adversarial Disease
network

109

Federated learning

GWAS statistics

149

Risk assessment

NA

82
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Table 1 (cont.) | A taxonomy of technical research articles on genomic data privacy featured in this Review
Attack or
protection

Use

Data flow

Data level

setting

How attacks or
protections are
achieved

Attributes studied other than
genotypes/how data are used

Refs

Primary

Use

Individual

Health care

Homomorphic
encryption

Disease susceptibility test

78

Controlled functional
encryption

Relatedness tests

79

SMC

Disease diagnosis

Homomorphic
encryption

GWAS computation

142,143

Homomorphic
encryption, SMC

GWAS computation

141,150

Homomorphic
encryption, TEE

GWAS computation

154

SMC

GWAS computation

145,146

TEE

GWAS computation

153,155

Symmetric encryption, GWAS computation
cryptographic
hardware

151

Homomorphic
encryption

Sequence matching, sequence
comparison

180

SMC

Sequence comparison

148

Fuzzy encryption

Relative identification

182

DTC

Private set
intersection protocols

Paternity test, genetic
compatibility test

181

Health care

Honey encryption

NA

Secure file format

NA

77

Confidentiality
Protection

Research

Research, DTC

Store
Secondary

Share

Individual
Individual

Summary

147

76

Research

Blockchain

NA

158

Research, DTC

Blockchain

NA

157

DTC

Blockchain, controlled
access, homomorphic
encryption, SMC

NA

161

Research

Blockchain

Machine learning model

159

Controlled access

GWAS statistics

DTC, forensic

Familial search,
genotype imputation,
genotype
reconstruction

Name, e-mail address

Forensic

Familial search, re-ID

Demographics

72

Familial search,
re-ID, genotype
imputation

Pedigree

73

Non-genotypic
attribute inference,
kin genotype
reconstruction

Pedigree

63

Attribute inference,
kin genotype
reconstruction

Pedigree, disease

65

39

81

Solitude
Attack

Secondary

Share

Individual

Individual,
summary

Protection

Research, DTC

Primary

Collect

Individual

Forensic

Controlled access,
encryptions

NA

Secondary

Share

Individual

DTC, research

Masking/hiding, risk
assessment

Pedigree

DTC, direct-to-consumer; GWAS, genome-wide association study; ID, identification; NA, not applicable; SMC, secure multiparty computation; TEE, trusted
execution environment.
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Phenome
The complete set of all
phenotypes expressed by
an organism as a result of
genetic variation in populations.
A phenotype is an individual’s
observable traits such as
height, eye colour, blood type,
skin colour, hair colour, specific
personality characteristics or
specific diseases.

Genome-wide association
studies
(GWAS). Observational studies
in which genetics research
scientists associate specific
genetic variations with traits
of interest, particularly human
diseases. For human disease
studies, this method scans the
genomes from many different
people and looks for genetic
markers (for example, singlenucleotide polymorphisms)
that occur more frequently
in people with a particular
disease than in people without
the disease.

Summary statistics
Numbers that give a quick
and simple description of a
set of records in a data set
(for example, mean, median,
minimum value, maximum
value and standard deviation).
A typical example of a
summary statistic in a GWAS
is a minor allele frequency.

Forensic or investigative
genetic genealogy
(FGG/IGG). A process in which
law enforcement seeks to
exploit public databases or
utilize the services of a directto-consumer genetic testing
company for forensic purposes.

Single-nucleotide
polymorphism
(SNP). The most common form
of DNA variation that occurs
when a single nucleotide (A, T,
C or G) at a specific position in
the genome differs sufficiently
(for example, 1% or more) in a
species’ population.

Linkage disequilibrium
Non-random correlations
among neighbouring alleles.
This occurs due to infrequent
recombination events between
nearby genomic loci, and
hence the alleles are typically
co-inherited by the next
generation.

Genotype imputation
A process of estimating missing
genotypes from a haplotype or
genotype reference panel.

Homer et al. demonstrated that GWAS summary statistics are vulnerable to membership inference attacks56,
whereby it is possible to discover an identified target’s participation in the GWAS as part of a potentially sensitive
group. Although the power of this attack was questioned
by other researchers57, subsequent studies showed that
the inference power can be further improved by leveraging statistics based on allele frequencies58, correlations59
and regression coefficients60. Furthermore, parameters
in machine learning (ML) models trained on individual-
level genomic data sets have the potential to disclose
the genotypes and memberships of the participants61.
Identifying an individual’s membership in a GWAS data
set could also reveal the participant’s sensitive clinical
information such as disease status62.
Reconstruction and familial search. Due to the similarity
of relatives’ genomic records, even if someone’s genomic
record has never been shared or even generated, their
genotypes and predispositions to certain diseases63 can
be inferred to a certain degree from their relatives’ shared
genotypes64. Recently, more powerful reconstruction
attacks have been proposed to infer individuals’ genotypes and phenotypes from their relatives’ genotypes and
phenotypes65,66.
In April 2018, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) used genomic data from a cold case to arrest a suspected serial murderer known as the Golden State Killer.
In this case, law enforcement officers used crime-scene
DNA from the then-unidentified suspect and uploaded
the sequence data to GEDmatch, a publicly accessible genomic database. Through a process known as
long-range familial search, whereby relatives can be
identified based on shared blocks of DNA sequence,
they found the suspect’s third cousin. From this starting
point in the suspect’s wider family, law enforcement
officers were then able to make further enquiries,
reconstruct a family tree and subsequently trace the
suspect. Although this case demonstrated the potential of the forensic use of familial search, now known as
forensic or investigative genetic genealogy (FGG/IGG), it
sparked privacy concerns67. Acknowledging these concerns, in May 2019, GEDmatch provided users with the
opportunity to opt in to allow their data to be used for
investigating violent crimes68. By May 2020, most (81%)
of GEDmatch’s 1.4 million users still have not opted in69,
and users concerned about privacy did delete their data70.
Potentially, users who uploaded data to GEDmatch
(or a similar database) and their relatives may still
be reached out using the long-range familial search
technique by anyone (for example, law enforcement
officers or hackers) who obtained their genomic data
elsewhere71. A study that received a great deal of attention predicted that, in a database of 1 million individuals,
60% of searches using genome data from individuals of
European descent as search queries will result in finding
a third cousin or closer match to the targeted individuals due to the high number of individuals of European
ancestry already in the database72. With the help of correlations between two types of genetic markers (that is,
single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) and STR markers),
the detection of relatives in genomic databases becomes

even easier73. Although most records in these databases
are not disclosed to end-users, stronger attacks have
aimed to reconstruct records in a database by uploading
strategically generated artificial records74,75.
Technical protections against intrusions
Security controls. An important element of protecting
privacy is preventing access to data by those who are
not entitled to them. Some attacks targeting genomic
data can be prevented by applying standard security
controls (for example, access control27 and crypto
graphic tools31,76–79) and restricting access to selected
trusted recipients27. For example, in response to attacks
demonstrated by Gymrek et al.54 and Homer et al.56,
the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the
Wellcome Trust moved certain demographics about
the participants80 as well as GWAS summary statistics81
into access-controlled databases. Subsequent studies
found the attack to be less powerful under more realistic
assumptions82, which contributed to the NIH’s decision
in 2018 to derestrict public access to genomic summary
statistics33.
If de-identified data need to be shared with an
untrusted third party or the public, the privacy of individuals to whom these data correspond can be protected
by perturbing83 (that is, limiting or altering) the data.
In the following sections and Fig. 2, we illustrate four
approaches for technical protection that perturb data
(that is, transformation, aggregation, obfuscation and
synthetic data generation) with examples in the context
of genomic data sharing.
Data transformation. Some have suggested that the
number of released genetic variants should be limited
because, among millions of SNPs in a person’s genome,
less than 100 statistically independent SNPs are required
to identify each person uniquely84. However, protecting
a genomic data set by hiding a set of genetic variants
may not be very effective due to correlations among
genetic variants (known as linkage disequilibrium)85 and
well-established genotype imputation techniques86.
To thwart re-identification through linkage in
general, Sweeney introduced k-anonymity87, a data
transformation model, to ensure that each record in a
released data set is equivalent to no fewer than (k − 1)
other records with the same quasi-identifying values
(that is, those which can be relied upon for linkage).
Initially developed to address demographics, it was
subsequently shown that this model could be applied to
genomic data by generalizing nucleotides into broader
types based on their biochemical properties to satisfy
2- anonymity 88. Another countermeasure based on
k-anonymity was proposed89 to thwart recent linkage
attacks using signal profiles90 and raw data from functional genomics (for example, RNA sequences)89. Still,
given the high dimensionality of genomic data, strategies
based on generalization or randomization84 are unlikely
to maintain the data at a level of detail that is useful for
practical study. Thus, certain legal mechanisms, such
as the HIPAA Expert Determination pathway, which
we detail later on, tie the notion of de-identification
to a re-identification risk assessment based on the
www.nature.com/nrg
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capabilities of a reasonable data recipient91. For research,
the utility (or usefulness) of genomic data should be
maximized when subjecting it to a protection (or transformation) method. As such, Wan et al. demonstrated
how to balance the tradeoff between utility and privacy
using models based on game theory92,93.
Data aggregation. Although restricting access to
data resources, such as the database of genotypes and
phenotypes (dbGaP)55, reduces privacy risks, it may
also impede research advances. One potential alternative is a semi-trusted registration-based query system94
that processes queries internally and releases only summary results back to the users instead of releasing all
individual-level data. For example, Beacon services
(for example, the Beacon Network), popularized by the
Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH),
let users query for only one type of information within
genomic data sets95, namely the presence of alleles.
Although a membership inference attack against
Beacon services was demonstrated by Shringarpure
and Bustamante 96 in 2015 and enhanced later 97,98,
the effects of this attack can be mitigated by adding
noise99,100, imposing query budgets99, adding relatives101
or strategically changing query responses for a subset of
genetic variants102.
Data obfuscation. Obfuscating, or adding noise to, summary statistics based on a computational model, such
as differential privacy (DP), has been used to counteract
membership inference attacks103. However, the role of DP
is limited in protecting GWAS and other data sets104,105
because a large amount of noise is required to provide
protection27. Even if aggregate statistics are released with
significant noise, membership and attribute information
can still be inferred106. To preserve privacy, the resulting utility of the DP model is therefore often extremely
low61. However, higher data utility could be achieved
when assuming a weaker adversarial model107 or combining DP with modern cryptographic frameworks
(for example, homomorphic encryption (HE), which we
detail later on)108.

Differential privacy
(DP). A privacy protection
model that publishes summary
statistics about a data set while
guaranteeing all potential
attackers can learn virtually
nothing more about an
individual than they would
learn if that person’s record
were absent from the data set.

Adversarial model
A model that characterizes
attackers’ behaviours and
incentives with certain
assumptions.

Synthetic data generation. Recently, researchers have
proposed protecting anonymity by generating synthetic genomic data sets using deep learning models
(for example, generative adversarial networks109,110 or
restricted Boltzmann machines110). The generated data
aim to maintain utility by replicating most of the characteristics of the source data and thus have the potential
to become alternatives for many genomic databases that
are not publicly available or have accessibility barriers.
Legal implications of data de-identification and use
The question of whether data are considered identifiable
or not has important implications for deciding whether
the individual to whom they pertain must give consent
for their use. It is important to recognize that the laws
regarding how genetic and genomic data are handled
differ among countries. For illustration, we compare and
contrast how regulations in the EU and the United States
influence the use of such data.
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General Data Protection Regulation. International data
privacy legislation is likely to alter the landscape of
data privacy protection in genomics research around
the world moving forward. The most notable example
is the EU’s GDPR, which took effect in 2018 and places
restrictions on entities that handle the personal information of citizens of the EU, including genetic information12.
The regulations grant data subjects access and deletion
rights, impose security and breach notification requirements on entities that handle personal information, and
place restrictions on the use and sharing of data without
informed consent. Since the GDPR was enacted, there
has been heated debate about its impact on the flow
of data and hence the conduct of genomics research.
Shabani and Marelli, for example, focus on the GDPR’s
recognition of the contextual nature of risk, and particularly the risk of re-identification, which they suggest can
be ameliorated by compliance with codes of conduct or
professional society guidance111. Mitchell et al. suggest
that it may be necessary to have more stringent controls
as well as to analyse data in place to avoid sharing112.
In a subsequent news story, Mitchell also pointed out
the complications posed by the emergence of identified
ancestry databases113.
The United States has several laws that address the
issue of identifiability, some of which have been in place
for many years, and which differ in important ways both
from each other and from the GDPR113.
United States: HIPAA. One of the most important laws
governing patient care and biomedical research is the
HIPAA and its Privacy Rule, which is limited in its
oversight to data in the possession of three types of covered entities (that is, health-care providers, health plans
and health-care clearinghouses) as well as the business
associates of such entities114. HIPAA generally requires
these entities to obtain patient authorization for uses and
disclosures of protected health information outside of
treatment, payment, and health-care operations and
conveys access rights to individuals115.
However, the protections provided by HIPAA even
within ‘covered entities’ contain numerous exceptions116.
In particular, HIPAA does not require permission to
use or disclose health information, including genomic
information, if it has been de-identified through either
one of two mechanisms that are colloquially referred to
as ‘Safe Harbour’ and ‘Expert Determination’. HIPAA
defines de-identified data as follows: “Health information that does not identify an individual and with
respect to which there is no reasonable basis to believe
that the information can be used to identify an individual is not individually identifiable health information.”
The Safe Harbour approach requires the removal of an
enumerated list of 18 explicit identifiers (for example,
names, social security numbers) and quasi-identifiers
(for example, date of birth and 5-digit ZIP code of residence)116 as well as an absence of actual knowledge that
the remaining information could be used alone or in
combination with other information to identify the individual. By contrast, the alternative Expert Determination
pathway requires the application of statistical and/or
computational mechanisms to show that the risk of
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Fig. 2 | Data perturbation approaches for privacy protection in genomic data
sharing. Each module (or submodule) can work independently to protect data as shown
by the corresponding data flow. In the transformation module, data can be masked93,
generalized88 and/or suppressed according to a privacy protection model (for example,
k-anonymity)87. In the aggregation module, data can be aggregated to summary
statistics81 or parameters in a machine learning (ML) model61. In the module of synthetic
data generation, a synthetic data set can be generated using a generative adversarial
network (GAN)110. In the obfuscation module, noise can be added to data using a privacy
protection model (for example, differential privacy)103. All contents in each module
(or submodule) are examples for illustration purposes only. In the example for the
generalization submodule, the plus sign represents a generalization of values one and
two for a genomic attribute. In the example for the submodule of summary statistics,
the minor allele frequency for each single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) marker is
computed for each group of individual records. (n represents the number of records
in the group; xi represents the value of a genomic attribute for the ith record in a group,
which is the number of minor alleles at a SNP position for a record in this example.)
In the example for the submodule of ML models, the neural network with three layers has
21 parameters (that is, 16 weights and 5 biases) that need to be learned. In the example
for the GAN submodule, X represents the input data set, G represents the generator
network and D represents the discriminator network. In the example for the reconstruction
attack in the module of risk assessment91, the attacker tries to reconstruct the original data
set by linkage and inference66, and the privacy risk is assessed by the data sharer using a
distance function. In the example for the membership inference attack in the module of
risk assessment92, the attacker tries to infer the membership of each targeted individual
by hypothesis testing58, and the privacy risk is assessed by the data sharer using a function
that measures the test’s accuracy. The reconstruction attack and the membership
inference attack are used here for illustration purposes only and could be replaced with
any other attack (for example, a re-identification attack or a familial search attack) or
some arbitrary combination of attacks. Data can be sequentially protected by multiple
modules and submodules before the privacy risk is mitigated to an acceptable level
and finally released. r represents the privacy risk; d represents the distance function;
f represents the function measures accuracy; θ represents the threshold for the
privacy risk.

Much research that utilizes genetic data qualifies as
minimal risk under the recently revised Common Rule
and could therefore be eligible for expedited Institutional
Review Board review122 and waiver of consent123. In
addition, secondary research involving data that were
initially collected for some other clinical or research
purpose and has been transformed into a non-identified
state (that is, data that have “been stripped of identifiers such that an investigator cannot readily ascertain a
human subject’s identity”)124 is currently exempt from
Common Rule regulations altogether, especially since
a proposal to consider biospecimens and DNA data
as identifiable per se was explicitly rejected when the
Rule was revised in 2017. Thus, informed consent is not
required for such research, a result that is generally much
more permissive than the exceptions permitted under
HIPAA. However, regulations governing identifiability
may change in the future as federal departments and
agencies were charged with formally re-examining the
definition of ‘identifiable private information’ and ‘identifiable biospecimen’ over time, expecting that emerging
technologies, such as whole-genome sequencing, may
make genomic data more easily distinguishable.

re-identification is very small (a term not explicitly
defined by the law)117. Notably, “biometric identifiers,
including finger and voice prints”, are listed as one of
18 identifiers, which could lead to the argument that
genomic data should be included as well but this issue
remains unsettled.

Other legal issues in the United States. The courts in the
United States, especially those at the federal level, have
been reluctant to endow individuals with a right to control access to biospecimens or resulting data125–127 or to
extend legal protections to discarded DNA22. Moreover,
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008 (GINA)128, which nominally prohibits genetic-
based discrimination in the context of health insurance
and employment, is limited in its scope, applying only
to asymptomatic individuals and offers no protection
regarding other types of insurance (for example, life
and long-term disability). The Affordable Care Act and
the Americans with Disabilities Act fill only some of
these gaps6.

United States: Common Rule. The protections afforded
to genomic information shared with researchers depend
heavily on the entity carrying out the research and the
nature of the information (for example, whether it is
shared in identifiable form or is instead converted into
de-identified or aggregated data). Human subjects
research conducted or funded by agencies within the
US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
and other federal departments is governed by the Federal
Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (that is, the
Common Rule), which was initially enacted in 1991
and most recently revised in 2017 (ref.14). Under the
Common Rule, such research is subject to oversight by
an Institutional Review Board, and investigators must
often obtain informed consent before biospecimens and
the resulting data can be used for research, thereby enabling the individuals to whom they pertain to have some
control over their use. Among many other elements, the
regulations require that investigators disclose if they
plan to use identifiable information118, to share identifiable data and samples broadly119, to return clinically
relevant research results to participants120, or to perform
whole-genome sequencing121.

State laws. By contrast, over the years, several US state
legislatures have enacted laws that convey additional
rights or protections to individuals with respect to
genetic information about them. For example, some
states have deemed genetic information to be the
property of the individual being tested and/or require
informed consent for genetic testing129. States may also
impose security requirements for genetic data or other
health records, regulate the retention of biospecimens
and data, or convey additional protections to research
participants. States, most notably California 130,131,
Virginia132 and Colorado133, have adopted broad data privacy legislation that provides people with much greater
control over some uses of information about them with
yet-uncertain implications for genomic information in
a variety of settings, including research134. Other states,
including Florida135 and New York136, are considering
legislation as well. The highly influential Uniform Laws
Commission, which proposes statutes for adoption,
explicitly defined “genetic sequencing information” as
sensitive and thus subject to special protections in its
proposed Uniform Personal Data Protect Act approved
in July 2021 by the Commission137. These proposed and
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Homomorphic encryption
(HE). A form of encryption
that permits computations
on encrypted data without
revealing the data to any
of the parties involved in the
cryptographic protocol.

Secure multiparty
computation
(SMC). A form of encryption
that enables multiple parties to
jointly compute a function of
their inputs without revealing
inputs.

Minor allele frequency
The proportion of the second
most common of two alleles at
a genomic position in a
population. An allele
corresponds to one of two or
more forms of genetic variant
at a genetic position. An
individual inherits two alleles
for each genetic position,
one from each parent.

Population stratification
The systematic difference in
allele frequencies between
subpopulations of a collection
of individuals.

enacted laws commonly grant more access and correction rights to individuals and impose more restrictions
on the use and sharing of personal information without
informed consent and thus approach more closely the
structure of the GDPR138. Nonetheless, the differences
among these statutes themselves and in relation to current federal and international law will doubtless further
complicate compliance.

Genomic privacy in context
Context matters
The primary focus of this Review is addressing the complex ethical, legal and technical challenges that arise in
protecting privacy in genomic research. Focusing solely
on genomic research fails to take into account the potential impact on privacy of the increasing availability of
such data in other settings. A wide variety of individuals
and entities now collect, use and share genomic data at an
unprecedented level. As a result, these data are becoming
an increasingly viable resource for parties who might
wish to exploit the data, including not only researchers, but also employers, insurers, law enforcement and
other individuals33, many of whom have garnered much
more media attention than those conducting biomedical
investigations. Numerous studies suggest that some people are worried about where genomic data about them
go and how they are used, potentially affecting them in
ways they neither desire nor expect. In addition to more
commonly explored fears of discrimination 3, this
information can also redefine family relationships, for
example, by confirming or disproving paternity, locating
previously unknown relatives, or identifying anonymous
gamete donors139. These concerns about use and impact,
generally couched in terms of desire for genetic privacy,
may affect individuals’ willingness to undergo clinical
testing or to participate in research3,140. Such reluctance
due to privacy concerns, in turn, may exacerbate existing health disparities and stifle scientific progress. Thus,
when they design, conduct and discuss their research,
investigators need to consider how genomic data are
used and how the type of use affects whether or not the
data are controlled outside the research setting as well.
Research setting
Technical protections. Researchers often use genomic
data accompanied by an array of phenotypic and other
information, which they may obtain from individuals
directly, through health-care providers or from third
parties such as DTC-GT companies. A researcher may
also transfer data to third parties for computation or collaboration purposes. Many cryptographic tools can be
deployed to protect such use of data from unauthorized
access29. Figure 3 illustrates four cryptographic protection approaches with examples in the context of genomic
data use cases.
Specifically, Fig. 3a illustrates a use case in which an
institution that lacks computing capability outsources a
computation task (for example, GWAS) to a third party
while keeping the data encrypted. Homomorphic encryption
(HE) enables computation on encrypted data sets without ever decrypting any specific record and can be
utilized when the computation of statistics (for example,

counts 141 , chi-s quare statistics 142 and regression
coefficients143) is outsourced to external data centres or
public clouds144.
To generate statistically meaningful findings in the
research setting, GWAS need many thousands of records
that are often distributed among multiple repositories
across various institutions, and even across jurisdictions. Secure multiparty computation (SMC), unlike HE,
enables multiple parties to jointly compute a function of
their inputs without revealing inputs28, as illustrated in
Fig. 3b, in which three institutions jointly compute summary statistics (for example, minor allele frequency) over
their private data sets. SMC enables the computation of
GWAS statistics over distributed encrypted repositories without the local statistics being released145, and it
can facilitate quality control and population stratification
correction in large-scale GWAS146. SMC can also be
applied to sequence matching in other settings147,148.
Compared to federated learning, which enables multiple
parties to jointly train ML models on genomic data sets
over local statistics149, SMC guarantees a much higher
security level at the cost of computationally expensive
encryption operations. To reduce both the computation
overhead and the communication burden, SMC can be
combined with HE to support GWAS analyses among a
large number (for example, 96) of parties150.
Cryptographic hardware can be leveraged to reduce
the burden of computation (for example, secure count
queries)151 on encrypted data using HE or SMC152. For
example, a trusted execution environment based on Intel
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) isolates the computation process in a protected enclave on one’s computer153,
as illustrated in Fig. 3c, in which an institution outsources
the task of computing summary statistics (for example,
minor allele frequency) to a third party. Combining
hardware (for example, Intel SGX) and algorithmic tools
(for example, HE154 or sketching155 — a data summarization method) can enable users to perform secure GWAS
analyses efficiently.
Fig. 3 | cryptographic approaches for privacy protection
in the use of genomic data. a | Homomorphic encryption
enables computation by a third party on encrypted data
without decrypting any specific record141. In this instance,
it is applied to a genome-wide association study142 and
a disease susceptibility test78. b | Secure multiparty
computation enables multiple parties to jointly compute
a function of their inputs without revealing inputs146. Here,
three institutions share encrypted data to third parties for
summary statistics (for example, minor allele frequency
(MAF)) computing145. c | A trusted execution environment,
such as Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)152, isolates
the computation process in an encrypted enclave using
central processing unit (CPU) support so that even malicious
operating system software cannot see the enclave
contents153. Here, an institution computes summary
statistics (for example, MAF) in a secure enclave of a third
party. d | A blockchain enables encrypted immutable records
stored on a decentralized network161. Here, the individual
manages the decryption key using a blockchain while
sharing encrypted data with researchers32. Avg., average;
RAM, random-access memory; SNP, single-nucleotide
polymorphism.
www.nature.com/nrg
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Blockchains can be adopted to incentivize genomic
data sharing156 while protecting privacy32,157. For example, researchers have proposed to use blockchains to
securely share GWAS data sets158 or parameters of ML
models trained on genomic data sets159. Figure 3d illustrates a distributed data sharing system, in which multiple independent parties hold shares of a split decryption
key and maintain a blockchain that receives data access
requests from researchers and consent from individual
participants32. Combined with HE and SMC, blockchains
can enable privacy-preserving analysis on genomic data
in a personally controlled160 and transparent manner161.
However, numerous practical challenges with blockchains
remain, including scalability, efficiency and cost157.
Legal protections. Countries around the world have put
in place provisions regarding the protection of human
research participants, which typically address the need to
weigh the risks and benefits to participants, particularly
for those who are vulnerable, to assess the scientific merit
of protocols, to protect privacy and confidentiality, and
to define the role of oversight by research ethics committees and the role of informed consent162. Although the
details differ across countries, the most recent version of
the Declaration of Helsinki, the foundational document
for international research ethics, generally requires consent only for “medical research using identifiable human
material or data”163. The Council for International
Organizations of Medical Sciences addressed this issue
in greater depth in Guideline 11 of its most recent
report in 2016 on International Ethical Guidelines for
Health-related Research Involving Humans164.
More generally, several international laws influence
the ability to access or share genomic data. As noted
above, the GDPR provides individuals with substantial
control over data about them, typically requiring consent for use and often forbidding the transfer of data to
countries whose data protections are not substantially
compliant with the GDPR165. Citing several national
and individual interests, China heavily regulates when
human genomic data can leave the country and requires
governmental approval166,167. India168 and many countries
in Africa169 have similar practices.
The United States lacks an overarching national data
privacy policy and does not typically impose limits on
the export of genomic data170. Moreover, the legal protections afforded to genomic information shared with
researchers depend heavily on the entity carrying out
the research and the nature of the information (for
example, whether it is shared in identifiable form or is
instead converted into de-identified or aggregated data)
as discussed above.
Private set intersection
A cryptographic technique that
allows two parties to compute
the intersection of their data
without exposing their raw
data to the other party.

Fuzzy encryption
In a fuzzy encryption scheme,
the encrypted data can
be decrypted by a set of
similar keys.

Non-research settings
In recent years, the use of genomic data in non-research
settings has garnered an enormous amount of public attention and can have important implications for
personal privacy.
Direct-to-consumer setting. Millions of US residents
have undergone DTC-GT with companies that purport to provide personal information about a variety of

issues, including health, ancestry, family relationships
(for example, paternity), and lifestyle and wellness171–173.
There are numerous media stories about how consumers use these data to reveal biological relationships,
uses that elicit complex responses139, both positive and
negative. Some people are pleased to find new relatives
or to uncover their biological origins, whereas others
are distressed by the results or by unwanted contact.
There are, however, virtually no legal constraints on
how consumers may use these data, although the legal
consequences that may result from their actions could
be considerable, including divorce and efforts to avoid
support for children19.
The companies offering these services generally fall
outside of the purview of the Common Rule and HIPAA
(being neither federally funded nor a HIPAA-covered
entity, respectively). Instead, the flow of genetic data in the
DTC setting is governed largely by self-regulation and
notice-and-choice in the form of privacy policies
and terms of service172,173. Recent surveys of the privacy policies and terms of service of DTC-GT companies reveal tremendous variability across the industry,
with many companies failing to meet best practices and
guidelines concerning privacy, secondary uses of genetic
information, and sharing of data with third parties172–174.
Although the industry has largely been left to
self-regulate, federal agencies have played a limited role
in shaping policy with respect to DTC-GT. For example, the US Food and Drug Administration has exercised
oversight over a narrow category of DTC health-related
tests, although the trend has been to allow these tests
to enter the market with little resistance175. The baseline of protection is provided by the Federal Trade
Commission, which has the authority to police unfair
and deceptive activities across all areas of commerce.
Perhaps hindered by its broad mandate and limited
resources, the agency to date has only intervened in the
DTC-GT space in one case of particularly egregious conduct (that is, unsubstantiated health claims coupled with
a lack of security of consumer personal information,
including genetic data)176. Instead, the agency has chosen
to embrace self-regulation, largely limiting its involvement to the issuance of consumer-facing bulletins177,178
about the implications of genetic testing and broad
guidelines for companies offering DTC-GT in the form
of a blog post179. For those who are interested, numerous
technical strategies exist to permit two users to match
genome sequences without disclosing their genomes
by using HE180, private set intersection protocols181 or
fuzzy encryption182, thereby providing additional privacy
protections.
Importantly, millions of people have downloaded
their results from DTC-GT and posted them on thirdparty databases to facilitate finding relatives or to obtain
health-related interpretations. These sites are rarely subject to any type of regulation beyond what they specify
in their terms of service173. Moreover, these sites reserve
the right to change their practices, which may occur as
a response to public pressure, but may also be due to
changes in business operations. These are the data that
facilitate forensic use and are likely to pose the greatest
potential for re-identification of genomic data.
www.nature.com/nrg

0123456789();:

Reviews
Forensic setting. Law enforcement looms large in
public opinion about genetic data since it may seek to
access genetic information, an issue that has gained
intense interest in the wake of high-profile cold cases
that were ultimately solved using such information183.
Over the years, there has also been an effort to expand
government-r un forensic databases at the federal,
state and local levels184. The FBI currently maintains a
nationwide database, the Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS), that contains the genetic profiles of over
20 million individuals185 who have been either arrested
or convicted of a crime as well as over 1 million forensic
profiles derived from crime scenes186.
Law enforcement may also seek to compel the disclosure of genetic information held by an individual or
an entity such as a health-care provider, DTC-GT company or researcher. A subpoena is generally all that is
required to compel disclosure of genetic information in
a patient’s electronic medical record under HIPAA187.
Genetic data held by researchers may be shielded by
government-issued Certificates of Confidentiality, which
purport to assure participants that such data are immune
from court orders and outside the reach of law enforcement, but these are issued by default only to research
funded by the NIH and other agencies within HHS and
may not protect research data that are placed in participants’ electronic health records as well as disclosures
required by federal, state and local laws188,189.
Furthermore, law enforcement may also seek to
exploit public databases or utilize the services of a
DTC-GT company for forensic genealogy purposes
in FGG/IGG. To date, law enforcement in the United
States has largely focused its efforts on publicly accessible databases (for example, GEDmatch)183 and private
databases held by companies that voluntarily cooperate
(for example, FamilyTreeDNA)190. For example, law
enforcement generated leads in dozens of cold cases by
uploading genetic profiles derived from crime scenes
to GEDmatch, a public database where individuals can
upload their DTC-GT data to learn about where their
forebears came from and to locate potential genetic relatives. Similarly, FamilyTreeDNA provides law enforcement access to a version of their Family Finder service,
which, like GEDmatch, allows consumers to upload
DTC-GT data to locate potential relatives.
In response to public privacy concerns, both
GEDmatch and FamilyTreeDNA changed their policies
to either require consumers to opt in for their genetic
information to be used for law enforcement matching
or provide an opportunity to opt out, rather than allowing such searches by default68. This change dramatically
reduced the pool of users available to law enforcement, leading them to seek court orders to explore
the entire databases of GEDmatch and Ancestry.com,
respectively187,191.
In 2019, the US Department of Justice released an
interim policy statement designed to signal its intentions regarding privacy and the use of FGG/IGG192.
The interim guidelines, which have not been updated
since, impose several limitations on federal law enforcement agencies, such as limiting these searches to
investigations of serious violent crimes (ill-defined in
Nature Reviews | Genetics
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the guidelines), requirements barring deception on the
part of law enforcement when utilizing a DTC service,
and requirements that the company seek informed consent from consumers surrounding their cooperation
with law enforcement192. At least one local district attorney’s office has developed, and voluntarily adopted, similar guidelines193. Given the recent emergence of these
tools, it is perhaps of little surprise that legal regimes are
evolving in different ways across the country and around
the world194,195.
At the same time, there has been limited research
into techniques to mitigate kinship privacy risks196 stemming from the familial genomic searches at the core of
FGG/IGG. One general approach is to optimize the
choice of SNPs that are masked to minimize the likelihood of successful inference based on relatives’ genomic
information196, but little follow-up work has been done
on this topic.

Conclusions
As this Review shows, providing appropriate levels of
privacy for genomic data will require a combination
of technical and societal solutions that consider the
context in which the data are applied. Yet, there are
challenges to achieving such goals. From a technical
perspective, for instance, it is non-trivial to move from
privacy-enhancing and security-enhancing technologies
that are communicated in a paper or tested in a small
pilot study to a full-fledged enterprise-scale solution.
This challenge is not unique to genomic data as it is a
dilemma for data more generally and for the application
domains in which data are applied. In addition, one of
the core problems is that it is difficult to build privacy
into infrastructure after it has been deployed. Rather,
privacy-by-design197, whereby the principles of privacy
are articulated at the outset of a project or the point at
which data are created and are tailored to the environment to which they are shared, may provide a more
systematic and sustainable approach to genomic data
protection. However, even if the principles are clearly
articulated, there is no guarantee that the technology
will support privacy in the long term. For instance, HE,
one of the technologies emerging for secure computation over genomic data, is constantly evolving. This may
make it difficult to compare genomic data encrypted
at one point in time with genomic data created under
a more recent version of the technology. Moreover,
encryption technologies are not necessarily ideal for
long-term management of data198, especially since new
computing technologies, such as cheap cloud computing
and quantum computing, might make it extremely cheap
to crack such encryptions.
Beyond technology, numerous social factors, which
inevitably involve tradeoffs between protection and utility, further complicate efforts to protect genomic privacy.
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